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Abstract
Entrepreneurs often face undiversiﬁable idiosyncratic risks from their business invest-
ments. Motivated by this observation, we extend the standard real options approach to
investment to an incomplete markets environment and analyze the joint decisions of busi-
ness investments, consumption-saving and portfolio selection. We show that precautionary
saving motive aﬀects the investment timing decision in an important way. When the in-
vestment payoﬀs are given in lump sum, risk aversion accelerates investment. For an agent
with suﬃciently strong precautionary motive, an increase in volatility may accelerate in-
vestment, opposite to the standard real options analysis. When the agent can trade the
market portfolio to partially hedge against the investment risk, the systematic volatility is
compensated via the standard CAPM argument, and the idiosyncratic volatility generates
a private equity premium. Finally, for the ﬂow payoﬀ case, the agent’s idiosyncratic risk
exposure alters both the implied option value and the implied project value, causing the
reversal of the results in the lump sum payoﬀ case.
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Real investment activities play a fundamental role in the economy. A real investment often has
three important characteristics. First, it is often partially or completely irreversible. Second,
its future rewards are uncertain. Finally, the investment time is to some extent ﬂexible. In the
last three decades, a voluminous literature has developed that aims to study the implications of
these three characteristics for the investment decision.1 A key insight of this literature is to view
making an investment decision as exercising an American style call option, where “American
style” refers to the ﬂexibility of choosing the time of option exercise. Based on this analogy
and the seminal contribution on option pricing by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973),
one can apply ﬁnancial option theory to analyze the irreversible investment decision. This real
options approach to investment has become a workhorse in modern economics and ﬁnance.
This real options approach relies on one of the following assumptions: (i) the real invest-
ment opportunity is tradable; (ii)i t sp a y o ﬀ can be spanned by existing traded assets; or (iii)
the agent is risk neutral. However, these assumptions are violated in many applications. For
example, consider entrepreneurial activities. Entrepreneurs combine their business investment
opportunities and ideas with their skills to generate economic proﬁts. While entrepreneurs may
have valuable projects, these projects may not be freely traded or their payoﬀsm a yn o tb e
spanned by existing assets because of liquidity restrictions or the lack of liquid markets. These
capital market imperfections may be due to moral hazard, adverse selection, transactions costs,
or contractual restrictions.2 Thus, the investment opportunities may have substantial undiver-
siﬁable idiosyncratic risks. Owning them exposes entrepreneurs to these undiversiﬁable risks.
Consequently, entrepreneurs’ well-being depends heavily on the outcome of their investments.
Moreover, entrepreneurs’ attitudes towards risk should play an important role in determining
their interdependent consumption-saving, portfolio selection, and investment decisions.3
While entrepreneurial activities have other important dimensions such as how much to
invest, and how to ﬁnance the investment project, we focus on the investment timing aspect
of entrepreneurial activities. We extend the standard real options approach to analyze the
implications of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk for this decision. We use a utility maximization
1Arrow (1968) and Bernanke (1983) are among early contributions on irreversible investment. For early
stochastic continuous-time models, see Brennan and Schwartz (1985), McDonald and Siegel (1986), Pindyck
(1988) and Bertola and Caballero (1994). Abel and Eberly (1994) provide a uniﬁed model of (incremental)
investment under uncertainty. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide a textbook treatment of important contributions
to this literature.
2Grenadier and Wang (2005) analyze a real options model with agency issues.
3There is a fast growing literature on empirical evidence for entrepreneurship. See Gentry and Hubbard
(2004), Heaton and Lucas (2000), and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), among others.
1framework in which an agent chooses his consumption and portfolio allocations, as well as
undertakes an irreversible investment.
To facilitate the discussions of our model and results, consider real estate development as
an example. The value of the vacant land may be viewed as the option value of developing the
real estate.4 Suppose that a land owner is also the one who knows the best use of his land.
For example, the owner has superior knowledge about the local market conditions and knows
the most proﬁtable property to construct due to his inalienable human capital. However, the
owner cannot sell this yet-to-be-developed property without incurring signiﬁcant value discount
due to transactions costs or asymmetric information such as moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion. Therefore, it may be of interest for the owner to keep the land (option) and to be the
developer even though owning the land exposes himself to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks of the
most proﬁtable property (underlying asset). It is worth noting that land is primarily held by
noninstitutional investors such as individuals and private partnerships (Williams (2001)). In
addition, individuals and private partnerships are subject to undiversiﬁable idiosyncratic risks
more than institutional investors like pension fund ﬁrms and life insurance companies.
While a real estate entrepreneur owns the land and will choose the time to build the property,
he may either sell the property or continue to manage the property after developing it. Of course,
choosing whether to sell or manage the property is of itself a decision. We assume this decision
is exogenous in the paper in order to focus on the eﬀect of idiosyncratic risks on the development
decision.5 When he pays the construction cost and sells the property upon the completion of
development, he then receives a lump-sum sale price. We dub this situation the lump-sum
payoﬀ case. Alternatively, the real estate entrepreneur may not only be the developer, but also
the manager. The entrepreneur may be the most qualiﬁed manager, because he can locate the
tenants with the highest willingness to pay and maintain the property at the lowest operating
expenses. Therefore, it may still make economic sense for the developer to manage the property
after construction is complete, even though he will face additional undiversiﬁable idiosyncratic
property risks after development. Under this setting, the developer receives a perpetual stream
of uninsurable rental payments (in excess of operating expenses) from managing the property
after development. We dub this scenario the ﬂow payoﬀ case.
4See Titman (1985), Williams (1991), and Grenadier (1996) for applications of the real options approach to
real estate development.
5We may extend our model to endogenize sale/no sale decision. Essentially, the sale situation is one where
the bidder with the highest valuation of the property is someone else who may have comparative advantages
in management. This ﬁts reasonably well into the description of merchant builders. The no-sale scenario
corresponds to the case where the developer may also be the best manager in that he can ﬁnd the tenants with
highest willingness to pay and manage the property with lowest operating expenses.
2Standard real options analysis (under complete markets) assumes that an agent can fully di-
versify the idiosyncratic property risks. One can then take the risk-adjusted present discounted
value of future cash ﬂows as the market sale value, and thus there is no distinction between
the preceding two scenarios. However, when the investment opportunity is not tradable and
not spanned by existing traded assets, the standard replicating and no arbitrage argument does
not apply. We thus follow the certainty equivalent approach in the literature on the pricing of
nontraded assets to value cash ﬂows by analyzing the entrepreneur’s utility maximization prob-
lem.6 We show that the lump-sum and ﬂow payoﬀ cases deliver diﬀerent economic predictions,
and hence the equivalence between these two cases no longer holds.
We start with the lump-sum payoﬀ case. We ﬁrst analyze the eﬀect of risk attitude. By
adopting the constant absolute riska v e r s i o n( C A R A )u t i l i t ys p e c i ﬁcation, we derive intuitive
semi-closed-form solutions which greatly simplify our analysis.7 For this utility, the risk aver-
sion parameter also measures the precautionary saving motive (captured by the convexity of
marginal utility (Kimball (1990)). We show that a stronger precautionary saving motive results
in lower certainty equivalent wealth associated with the investment opportunity, which is also
the implied option value. Thus, risk aversion speeds up investment.
We next turn to the eﬀect of risk. An important prediction of our model is that the idiosyn-
cratic project volatility has two opposing eﬀects on the implied option value and hence on the
investment timing decision. On one hand, the standard real options model states that volatility
increases the option value due to its asymmetric convex payoﬀ. On the other hand, idiosyncratic
volatility lowers the certainty equivalent wealth and consumption because of the entrepreneur’s
precautionary saving motive and the interdependence of consumption and investment under
incomplete markets. Hence, the net eﬀect of volatility on the option value is ambiguous. When
the entrepreneur has suﬃciently strong precautionary motive or the idiosyncratic volatility is
suﬃciently large, the precautionary saving eﬀect may dominate the standard option eﬀect. If
the volatility does not directly aﬀect the investment payoﬀ as in the lump-sum payoﬀ case (for
example via sale to diversiﬁed buyers such as real estate investment trusts (REITs) investors
in our real estate example), then idiosyncratic volatility under incomplete markets encourages
the entrepreneur to invest earlier, opposite to the standard real options analysis. Going back
6See Carpenter (1998), Detemple and Sundaresan (1999), Hall and Murphy (2000), Kahl, Liu and Longstaﬀ
(2003), among others, on nontraded asset valuation such as employee stock options. See Section 2 for further
discussions.
7While power utility is more commonly used in economics, this utility will complicate our anlaysis since it
will lead to a two dimensional free-boundary problem, which is hard to analyze. See Section 2.2 for a further
discussion. We should emphasize that our key insight of precautionary saving eﬀect still carries over for the
power utility.
3to our real estate development example, our model predicts that the entrepreneur may exercise
his development option early when he is exposed to uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to his
investment opportunity, particularly if he plans to sell his property upon the completion of
construction. The entrepreneur’s urge to avoid the certainty equivalent wealth discount due to
idiosyncratic shocks encourages him to invest earlier, ceteris paribus.
When the entrepreneur can hedge against the project risk by trading a risky asset such as
the market portfolio, the total volatility may be decomposed into idiosyncratic and systematic
volatility. As a result, the entrepreneur’s precautionary saving demand (due to idiosyncratic
volatility) is then mitigated, which in turn makes the investment option more valuable, ceteris
paribus. When the investment payoﬀ is independent of the idiosyncratic volatility (for example
via sale to diversiﬁed buyers), the model then predicts that the entrepreneur invests sooner
under incomplete markets than under complete markets, because the option value is lower in
the presence of idiosyncratic shocks.
We ﬁnally analyze the case where the investment payoﬀsa r eg i v e ni nﬂow terms. In our
previous real estate development example, this case corresponds to the one where the developer
also manages the real estate after its completion. Because the developer still faces undiversiﬁable
idiosyncratic risk from the payoﬀ stream after exercising the investment option, he values this
payoﬀ stream as certainty equivalent wealth lower than the level, if the payoﬀ steam were
marketable. Thus, the previously discussed precautionary saving eﬀect also inﬂuences the
certainty equivalent value of the project payoﬀs after exercising the investment option. Because
of this additional eﬀect, many results obtained in the lump-sum payoﬀ case are reversed.
In addition to contributing to the investment (real options) literature, our paper also con-
tributes to the portfolio choice literature. Building on the insights behind the Black-Merton-
Scholes analysis, we study hedging against endogenously timed income under incomplete mar-
kets.8 We show that the hedging demand increases with the investment option delta.9 Since
the option delta increases in the underlying project payoﬀ value, our model predicts that the
developer’s hedging demand increases when his development option gets closer to being “in the
money.” With regard to the consumption-saving literature, we extend the standard incomplete
markets analysis to allow the agent to endogenously determine the timing of his income process.
We show that volatility not only has a negative eﬀect on consumption, but also a positive option
eﬀect due to the endogeneity of the income timing choice.
8See Svensson and Werner (1993), Duﬃe et al. (1997), Koo (1998), Viceira (2001), Heaton and Lucas (2000),
Davis and Willen (2002), and Chapter 6 in Campbell and Viceira (2002), among others, on dynamic consumption
and portfolio choice when an investor is endowed with nontraded stochastic income.
9Delta is deﬁned as the change in the investment option value for a unit increase of the underlying project
payoﬀ value.
4Two recent papers, Henderson (2005) and Hugonnier and Morellec (2005), are related to
ours. Henderson (2005) assumes that the agent maximizes expected wealth at the time of
investment. Hugonnier and Morellec (2005) assume that the manager trades oﬀ his incentives to
exercise an option under incomplete markets pre-maturely in order to lower the idiosyncratic risk
exposure and the cost of increasing the likelihood of control challenge due to eﬃciency loss and
ﬁrm value destruction. While both papers study real options models under incomplete markets,
neither paper studies an agent’s consumption decision and its interaction with investment and
portfolio choice decisions. As in our lump-sum payoﬀ case, both papers show that market
incompleteness encourages an agent to exercise the investment option earlier. Importantly,
we show that investment may also be delayed due to market incompleteness when investment
payoﬀs are delivered over time in ﬂows rather than delivered once in lump-sum payment. Our
results demonstrate that the timing of payoﬀs after investment is important in determining the
investment timing decision.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes a self-insurance model
when the payoﬀ from real investment is given in lump sum. Section 3 generalizes the model
in Section 2 to allow for the hedging opportunity. Section 4 extends the models in Sections 2
and 3 to settings in which the real investment payoﬀsa r eg i v e ni nﬂows. Section 5 concludes.
Technical details are relegated to appendices.
2 A Self-Insurance Model with Lump-sum Payoﬀ
This section provides a simple model that allows us to develop intuition for how the agent’s at-
titude towards risk aﬀects his investment decisions when he cannot fully insure himself against
the idiosyncratic shocks from investment. In order to achieve this objective in the simplest pos-
sible setting, we integrate a canonical consumption/saving model with a standard real options
based irreversible investment model.10
2.1 Model Setup
Time is continuous and the horizon is inﬁnite. There is a single perishable consumption good







10See Leland (1968) for early studies on precautionary savings. See Zeldes (1989), Caballero (1991b), and
Deaton (1991) for dynamic incomplete markets consumption models. See Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Mc-
Donald and Siegel (1986), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for standard real options models.
5where U is an increasing and concave function and β>0 is his discount rate. For expositional
convenience, we assume that β is equal to r, the risk-free interest rate.11
The agent owns an investment project and can undertake this project irreversibly at some
endogenously chosen time τ. Note that the investment time τ is stochastic from today’s per-
spective. The investment costs I>0. The agent pays this cost only at the investment time
τ.T h i sc o s ti sﬁnanced from the agent’s own wealth. If there is a shortage of fund, the agent
may borrow at the risk-free rate r. In order to focus on the eﬀect of market incompleteness in
the simplest possible setting, we do not consider borrowing constraints or costly external ﬁ-
nancing. Instead, we impose the conventional transversality condition for the agent to rule out
Ponzi games. After the agent exercises the investment option at time τ, the project generates
a lump-sum payoﬀ Xτ. We also assume that the payoﬀ process X is governed by an arithmetic
Brownian motion process
dXt = αx dt + σx dZt,X 0 given, (2)
where αx and σx are positive constants and Z is a standard Brownian motion.12 This process
implies that payoﬀs may take negative values. We interpret negative values as losses. We
choose the arithmetic Brownian motion purely for analytical convenience and for being in line
with further analysis in Section 4 when the payoﬀsa r eg i v e ni nﬂow terms over time. We may
obtain essentially the same insights by using a geometric Brownian motion process to model
the payoﬀs.
As discussed earlier, investing in the project is analogous to exercising a perpetual American
call option, in the sense that the agent has the right but not the obligation to invest at some
future time of his choosing. Importantly, unlike for ﬁnancial options, the underlying asset for
the real option may not be traded in the market. For example, the building (the underlying
asset in the real estate development example) before it is set up is not traded in the market.
If we further assume that existing ﬁnancial assets do not completely span the payoﬀsf o rt h e
underlying asset (the building), then we cannot apply the dynamic replication argument in
the standard option pricing theory such as the Black-Merton-Scholes model. In this section,
the only ﬁnancial asset available for the agent to trade and to smooth his consumption is the
risk-free asset. Hence, the agent inevitably bears the project risk, which are all undiversiﬁable.
11It is straightforward to extend our analysis to allow for diﬀerences between the agent’s subjective discount
rate and the interest rate. We choose not to, however, because no additional insight will be gained for the issue
that we are after.
12Unlike the often adopted geometric Brownian motion process, the speciﬁcation in (2) proves more conve-
nient within our setup. Wang (2005) derives a closed-form consumption-saving rule using aﬃne processes and
exponential utility.
6Let {Wt : t ≥ 0} denote a wealth process. Then the wealth dynamics are given by
dWt =( rWt − Ct)dt, W0 given. (3)
That is, the agent accumulates wealth at the rate of (rWt − Ct), the diﬀerence between the
interest income rWt and consumption rate Ct.A tt h e i n v e s t m e n t t i m eτ, the agent pays the
investment cost I and obtains the lump-sum payoﬀ Xτ, and hence his wealth is raised by the
amount (Xτ − I). That is, the agent’s wealth jumps by a discrete amount (Xτ − I) at τ,i nt h a t
Wτ = Wτ−+Xτ −I,w h e r eWτ− and Wτ denote the agent’s wealth just before and immediately
after the agent exercises the investment option, respectively. The agent’s optimization problem
is to choose both his investment timing strategy τ and consumption process C to maximize his
utility given in (1) subject to (3) and a transversality condition speciﬁed later.
2.2 Optimality Conditions
We solve the agent’s decision problem by working backwards using dynamic programming. We
consider ﬁrst the problem after the agent exercises the investment option. In this case, the
agent’s optimization problem is a standard deterministic consumption-saving problem without
income. Let V 0 (w) be the corresponding value function. By a standard argument, V 0 (w)
satisﬁes the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:13
rV 0(w)=m a x
c∈R
U(c)+( rw − c)V 0
w(w). (4)
Under the deterministic setting, the agent’s consumption is constant over time and is equal to
the annuity value rw of his wealth, and therefore, his wealth remains constant at w at all times.
This is the familiar consumption smoothing result.14 It is immediate to conclude that the value
function is thus given by V 0(w)=U(rw)/r.
We next consider the case before the option is exercised. It is worth noting that the agent’s
value function depends on both his wealth w and the current value x of his investment opportu-
nity. Let V (w,x) denote the corresponding value function. The standard dynamic programming
argument implies that V (w,x) satisﬁes the following HJB equation:
rV(w,x)=m a x
c∈R





The above HJB equation is similar to an asset pricing equation. It states that the agent chooses
his consumption optimally by setting the return rV(w,x) of his value function to equal the sum





=0must also be satisﬁed.
14This result follows from two steps: (i) the equality between the agent’s discount rate and the interest rate
implies that the marginal utility is constant at all times (U
0(Ct)=U
0(Cs)); (ii) The strict concavity of the utility
function further implies that Ct = Cs.
7of his instantaneous utility U(c) and the total expected changes of his value function (due to
the change in wealth and also in the investment opportunity).
We now specify boundary conditions. First, the no-bubble condition limx→−∞ V (w,x)=
V 0 (w) must be satisﬁed. This condition states that when the investment payoﬀ goes to negative
inﬁnity, the agent will never exercise the investment option and his value function is equal to
that without the investment option. Next, as is standard in the optimal stopping problems, at
the instant of investment, the following value-matching condition must hold:
V (w,x)=V 0(w + x − I). (6)
This equation implicitly deﬁnes an investment boundary x = x(w). In general, this boundary
x(w) depends on the agent’s wealth level w. Finally, because this boundary is chosen optimally,
the following smooth-pasting condition is satisﬁed:15
∂V (w,x)
∂x
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
x=x(w)
=
∂V 0 (w + x − I)
∂x





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
x=x(w)
=
∂V 0 (w + x − I)
∂w
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
x=x(w)
. (8)
The ﬁrst smooth-pasting condition (7) states that the marginal change of the investment oppor-
tunity has the same marginal eﬀect on the agent’s value functions just before and immediately
after exercising the option. Similarly, the second smooth-pasting condition (8) states that the
marginal eﬀect of wealth must be the same on the agent’s value functions just before and im-
mediately after exercising the option. Unlike the conventional irreversible investment models
(Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), here the agent’s wealth enters as an additional state variable, which
gives rise to the second smooth-pasting condition (8).
2.3 Model Solution for CARA Utility
We have now formulated the agent’s optimization problem as a combined control (consumption)
and stopping (investment) problem, which is generally diﬃcult to solve. Our objective is to
understand the economic eﬀects of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and the attitude towards risk
on investment and consumption decisions. In order to achieve this objective in the simplest
possible way, we assume that the agent has CARA utility U (c)=−e−γc/γ, where the parameter
γ>0 is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. It is also equal to the coeﬃcient of absolute
prudence −U000 (c)/U00 (c), which captures the precautionary saving motive (Kimball (1990)).
While CARA utility does not capture the wealth eﬀect, we emphasize that the main results and
15See, for example, Krylov (1980), Dumas (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
8insights of this paper do not rely on the choice of this utility function. As we will see below,
the driving force of the paper is the precautionary saving, which can be captured by any utility
function having convex marginal utility. We leave generalization to incorporate wealth eﬀects
for future research.










exp[−γr(w + G(x))], (10)
where G(x) is a function to be determined. One can interpret G(x) as the certainty equivalent
wealth derived from the agent’s investment opportunity. Speciﬁcally, we follow the consump-
tion literature to deﬁne certainty equivalent wealth as the value wce satisfying the equation
V 0(w+wce)=V (w,x); that is, the agent is indiﬀerent between the situation where he receives
stochastic income in the future and the situation where he has no income but a total wealth level
of (w + wce). Using the explicit functional forms of V 0(w) and V (w,x),w eh a v ewce = G(x).
The boundary conditions (6)-(8) and the additive separability of wealth w and certainty
equivalent wealth G(x) in the exponent of the value function V (w,x) indicate that the invest-
ment boundary is ﬂat, in that x(w) is independent of wealth w. This property substantially
simpliﬁes our analysis. The following proposition summarizes the solution to the agent’s com-
bined consumption and investment problem.
Proposition 1 The agent exercises the investment option the ﬁrst time the process X hits the
threshold ¯ x from below. After exercising the option, the agent’s value function and consumption
rule are given by (9) and c(w)=rw, respectively. Before exercising the option, his value
function and consumption rule are, respectively, given by (10) and
c(w,x)=r(w + G(x)), (11)










subject to the no-bubble condition limx→−∞ G(x)=0 , and the boundary conditions:
G(¯ x)=¯ x − I, (13)
G0 (¯ x)=1 . (14)
9Moreover, G is increasing.
We now analyze the intuition behind this proposition and discuss its implications.
2.4 Interdependence of Investment and Consumption
As in the standard real options approach, the agent trades oﬀ between holding the investment
option to obtain an implied option value of waiting and exercising this option to obtain in-
vestment payoﬀs. The key to our analysis is to derive the implied option value. We show
below that, unlike the standard real options approach, risk aversion and consumption play an
important role in the determination of the option value under incomplete markets.
Implied Option Value. Proposition 1 demonstrates that the certainty equivalent wealth
G(x) solves a free-boundary problem (12)-(14). These equations are similar to, but diﬀerent
from, the valuation equations and boundary conditions in the standard real option models
of McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Based on this similarity, we
interpret x as the project value and the certainty equivalent wealth G(x) as the implied option
value to invest in the underlying project. More formally, we follow the literature on the pricing
of nontraded assets by deﬁning the implied option value Q of the project as the solution to the
equation V (w −Q,x)=V 0(w); that is, the agent is indiﬀerent between the situation where he
has no investment opportunity and the situation where he pays the price Q and obtains the
investment opportunity. Given the functional form of V 0 and V in (9) and (10), we see that
Q = G(x).
The two interpretations of G(x) — the certainty equivalent wealth and the implied option
value — are the same in our setup. This is due to the absence of the wealth eﬀect under CARA
utility. We will thus use certainty equivalent wealth (from the consumption literature per-
spective) and implied option value (from the investment literature perspective) interchangeably
throughout the remainder of the paper.
Proposition 1 nests the standard (risk neutral) real options problem as a special case. Setting
γ =0in equation (12) enables us to derive the following explicit solutions for the option value














x for σx > 0,a n dλ0 = r/α for σx =0 . It is straight-
forward to verify that both the option value G(x) and the investment threshold ¯ x increase in
10volatility σx of the payoﬀ. These are the main results of the real options literature. The agent
can capture the upside gains by investing and limit the downside losses by simply waiting until
the option is suﬃciently “in the money.” This asymmetric convex payoﬀ generates the positive
eﬀect of volatility on the option value and investment threshold.
The main diﬀerence between our model and the standard (risk neutral) real options model
is that option value G(x) depends not only on the parameters describing the risk-free rate r,
drift αx and volatility σx, but also depends on the agent’s precautionary motive. The latter
dependence captures the notion that the agent’s risk attitude matters not only for consumption
decisions, but also for investment decisions when markets are incomplete. The last nonlinear
term on the right side of (12) captures the agent’s precautionary savings motive. It conﬁrms
the intuition that the implied option value G(x) is lower when the precautionary motive is
stronger, ceteris paribus.S i n c et h ep r o j e c tp a y o ﬀ value x does not depend on the agent’s risk
attitude, the net eﬀect of an increase in γ is to encourage earlier investment. Figure 1 plots
the implied option value G(x) versus the value of the underlying investment opportunity x
for two values of γ. Note that the payoﬀ line (x − I) is independent of risk aversion γ,t h i s
ﬁgure clearly illustrates that the investment threshold decreases with the agent’s precautionary
motive or risk aversion γ.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
Investment Threshold. To gain further intuition, we use the asymptotic approximation
method to compute approximate solutions for the implied option value G(x) and the investment
threshold ¯ x.16 We expand the option value G(x) and the investment threshold ¯ x to the ﬁrst
order of σ2
x,i nt h a tG(x) ≈ G0 (x)+G1 (x)σ2
x and ¯ x ≈ ¯ x0 + δ1σ2
x ≡ ¯ x1. Plugging these
expansions in (12)-(14), we show in the appendix that ¯ x0 = I + αx/r and










This approximate solution indicates that, to a ﬁrst-order approximation with respect to σ2
x,a
stronger precautionary motive (higher γ) lowers the investment threshold, consistent with our
earlier discussions based on the non-linear ODE (12) and the boundary conditions (13)-(14).
The above approximate solution also helps us to understand the eﬀect of volatility on in-
vestment threshold. An increase in volatility σx has two opposing eﬀects. On one hand, a
higher volatility increases option value and hence encourages waiting, as in standard real op-
tion models. On the other hand, an increase in σx also raises the precautionary savings demand
16See Judd (1998). Kogan (2001) applies this method to solve an irreversible (incremental) investment model.
11and hence lowers the certainty equivalent wealth G(x), and hence lowers the threshold, ceteris
paribus.B o t he ﬀects are reﬂected in the last term on the right side of (16). When γ is suﬃ-
ciently small, the option eﬀect dominates the precautionary saving eﬀect. Thus, an increase in
volatility σx raises the implied option value and delays investment, same as the predictions in
the standard real options models. By contrast, when γ is suﬃciently large, the precautionary
saving eﬀect may dominate the option eﬀect. Therefore, an increase in σx lowers the certainty
equivalent wealth G(x), and hence encourages the agent to exercise his option sooner, opposite
to the standard real options result.
Finally, we use numerical solutions to conﬁrm our intuition. We apply the projection method
detailed in the appendix to solve the free boundary problem characterized by (12)-(14). We
ﬁnd that, for a small σx, our preceding approximate solution is very close to the “true” solution
delivered by the projection method. For a large range of parameter values, Figure 2 plots
the investment threshold as a function of the volatility σx and the parameter γ.T h i s ﬁgure
demonstrates that our preceding results and intuition extend to general parameter values.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Consumption. We now turn to the agent’s consumption policies. After exercising the option,
the agent solves a deterministic consumption smoothing problem. As noted earlier, his wealth
remains constant and consumption is equal to the interest income at all times. Before exercising
the option, the agent’s consumption rule (11) is given by the annuity value of the sum of his
ﬁnancial wealth w and his certainty equivalent wealth G(x).
Even though the agent does not receive payoﬀ x before exercising the option, he rationally
anticipates that he will exercise his investment option some time in the future. Thus, the
future investment payoﬀ matters not only for his future consumption, but also for his current
consumption. Our model captures the forward-looking consumption smoothing intuition in an
incomplete markets setting with endogenous stochastic income.
The standard intuition in the consumption literature is that volatility lowers consumption
because of precautionary motive. Here, we show that consumption may potentially increase in
volatility because the option eﬀect may dominate the precautionary saving eﬀect on G(x).T h i s
eﬀect is not present in the consumption literature, because almost all models in the consumption
literature take stochastic income as exogenously given and hence rules out the option eﬀect of
income volatility on consumption.
In summary, the uninsurable idiosyncratic risk alters results in the standard real options
and consumption literature. When idiosyncratic risk is large or the precautionary motive is
12strong, the option value and the investment threshold may decrease in volatility, contrary to
the standard real option results. Therefore, applying the real options analysis and ignoring
consumption smoothing motive to settings where the idiosyncratic risk is likely to matter such
as entrepreneurial investments, is potentially misleading and incorrect.
3L u m p - s u m P a y o ﬀ Case with Hedging Opportunities
In the previous section, the agent can trade only a risk-free asset to partially insure himself
against the project risk. The restriction that the agent can only insure via the risk-free asset
is obviously strong. We now generalize the setting by allowing the agent to trade a risky
asset to partially hedge against the project risk. We may interpret this ﬁnancial asset as the
market portfolio. Unlike the self-insurance model in the previous section where all risks are
idiosyncratic and uninsurable, investing in the risky asset allows the agent to partially hedge and
hence separate systematic volatility from idiosyncratic volatility. We show that distinguishing
idiosyncratic volatility from systematic volatility is of fundamental importance, because these
two volatilities play diﬀerent roles in determining the option value and the exercising decisions.
Our analysis nests the standard complete-markets analysis as a special case.
3.1 The Model
Let {Pt : t ≥ 0} denote the risky asset’s price process and assume that the return is governed
by the following process:
dPt/Pt = μedt + σedBt, (17)
where μe and σe are positive constants, and B is a standard Brownian motion correlated with
the Brownian motion Z, which drives the innovations of the project payoﬀ as given in (2). Let
ρ ∈ [−1,1] be the correlation coeﬃcient between the return on the risky asset and the agent’s
project payoﬀ,a n dl e tη =( μe − r)/σe > 0 denote the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio.
One can alternatively rewrite the observed payoﬀ process {Xt : t ≥ 0} g i v e ni n( 2 )a sf o l l o w s :
dXt = αxdt + ρσxdBt +  x d e Bt, (18)
where B and e B are two independent standard Brownian motions, and
 x =
p
1 − ρ2 σx. (19)
One may think of B as the Brownian motion describing the systematic (market) risk, and
thus ρσx is the systematic component of the volatility for the project payoﬀ. One may then
13interpret e B as the Brownian motion describing the idiosyncratic project risk, and thus  x is the
idiosyncratic volatility. A higher absolute value of the correlation coeﬃcient |ρ| implies that
systematic volatility has a larger weight, ceteris paribus.
Let πt be the amount allocated to the risky asset at time t, measured in units of the
consumption good. The agent’s problem is to choose a consumption process C,ap o r t f o l i o
allocation rule π, and an investment timing strategy τ to maximize his utility (1) subject to his
wealth dynamics:
dWt =( rWt + πt (μe − r) − Ct)dt + πtσedBt,W 0 given. (20)
Similar to Section 2, the agent’s wealth jumps immediately after he invests, in that Wτ =
Wτ−+Xτ−I,where Wτ− and Wτ are his wealth just before and immediately after his investment
at time τ, respectively. Note that (20) is the same both before and after the option exercise.
We use the same dynamic programming method as in Section 2 to solve the agent’s problem
and summarize the results below.
Proposition 2 The agent exercises the investment option the ﬁrst time the process X hits the
































where (G, ¯ x) is the solution to the following free boundary problem:









subject to the no-bubble condition limx→−∞ G(x)=0 , and also the boundary conditions
G(¯ x)=¯ x − I, (26)
G0(¯ x)=1 . (27)
Moreover, G is increasing.
We next discuss the implications of this proposition and analyze the role of hedging.
143.2 Undiversiﬁable Idiosyncratic Risk and Implied Option Value
Similar to the self-insurance model in Section 2, we may interpret G(x) either as the certainty
equivalent wealth, or as the implied option value. Before discussing the option value G(x),
we ﬁrst sketch out the standard complete markets model when the idiosyncratic risk is fully
diversiﬁable. Let Φ(x) denote the option value under complete markets. Given complete
markets, standard ﬁnance theory implies that the option value and the investment threshold
are independent of preferences. Indeed, we may apply the martingale method to rewrite the
dynamic budget constraint as a static Arrow-Debreu budget constraint.17 Appendix B shows
that Φ(x) satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation:





and the boundary conditions limx→−∞ Φ(x)=0 , Φ(x∗)=x∗ − I, and Φ0(x∗)=1 .
Equation (28) resembles a standard valuatione q u a t i o ni nd y n a m i ca s s e tp r i c i n gm o d e l s . 18
After correcting for risk, traded securities such as the option earn the risk-free rate of return
r, as seen from the left side of (28). The right side of (28) gives the instantaneous expected
changes of the option value with respect to the underlying asset value x. The risk correction is
reﬂected by the drift change from αx to (αx − ρσxη) in the ﬁrst term on the right side of (28).
This risk correction may be obtained from a CAPM argument and is consistent with standard
dynamic asset pricing theories, which state that only systematic risk demands a premium.
We turn to the diﬀerential equation (25) for the option value G(x). Re-writing (25) gives
rG(x)=
µ











First, we note that the standard convexity eﬀect of volatility on option value depends on the
total volatility σx, same as the one in (28) under complete markets. This is reﬂected by the
last (quadratic) term in (29). Also similar to the diﬀerential equation (28) for Φ(x), the change
of drift from αx to (αx − ρσxη) in the ﬁrst term on the right side of (29) accounts for the
eﬀect of systematic risk on valuation, the standard CAPM argument. Importantly, unlike the
diﬀerential equation (28) for Φ(x), the third component in the bracket of the drift term on the
right side of (29), γr 2
xG0(x)/2 reﬂects the eﬀect of the idiosyncratic risk on the implied option
value G(x). We may dub this term as the idiosyncratic risk premium.
17See Cox and Huang (1989), and Karatzas, Lehoczky, and Shreve (1987) on the martingale method. This
method and the dynamic programming method deliver the same solution. See Duﬃe (2001) for a textbook
treatment.
18See Duﬃe (2001) for a textbook treatment.
15Intuitively, when idiosyncratic risks cannot be fully diversiﬁed, the agent naturally demands
a higher risk premium for a larger idiosyncratic volatility  x, ceteris paribus. A more prudent
agent (with a larger coeﬃcient of risk aversion γ) also demands a higher risk premium. Finally,
a higher option delta G0(X) indicates that the option value is more sensitive to the change of the
underlying investment opportunity set and hence requires a higher idiosyncratic risk premium.
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) ﬁnd that the private equity premium is low in the
U.S. given the amount of idiosyncratic risks that entrepreneurs face. While our model is not
designed to address this quantitative private equity premium issue, our model responds to urgent
needs to develop theories which capture the role of the idiosyncratic risk on the interdependent
consumption, investment and portfolio choices for entrepreneurs, as suggested by Gentry and
Hubbard (2004), Heaton and Lucas (2000), and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
We now turn to the eﬀects of idiosyncratic volatility  x a n dr i s ka v e r s i o nc o e ﬃcient γ on the
investment threshold ¯ x. First, note that as in the self-insurance model of Section 2, the payoﬀs
upon option exercising are given by (x − I). Hence, neither idiosyncratic volatility nor risk
aversion γ matters for the project payoﬀ values. Second, a direct comparison between (28) and
(29) implies that a larger idiosyncratic volatility  x or a higher risk aversion coeﬃcient γ lowers
the option value G(x), holding the systematic risk constant. Taking the two eﬀects together,
we may conclude that a higher idiosyncratic volatility  x and a larger risk aversion coeﬃcient
γ lowers the investment threshold ¯ x, ceteris paribus. This result also implies that the agent
hastens investment under incomplete markets than under complete markets since the solution
for the latter is eﬀectively obtained by setting γ =0 .
3.3 Consumption and Portfolio Rules
The consumption rule (21) and the portfolio rule (22) after the option exercise are solutions to
the standard Merton style consumption-portfolio choice problem with CARA utility (Merton
(1969)). After exercising the option, the agent has no more hedging demand since the lump-
sum project payoﬀ has been realized at the exercising time τ. Equation (22) gives the standard
mean-variance eﬃcient rule for CARA utility. The agent’s ability to invest in the risky asset to
explore the risk premium makes him better oﬀ relative to the self insurance setting in Section
2. This is reﬂected by η2/(2γr2), the second term in the consumption rule (21).
Next, consider the agent’s consumption decision before the option exercise. Equation (23)
states that the agent’s consumption is equal to the annuity value of the sum of three terms:
(i) ﬁnancial wealth w, (ii) certainty equivalent wealth G(x),a n d(iii) the constant η2/(2γr2).
The forward looking agent rationally ﬁnances a certain fraction of his current consumption via
16the certainty equivalent wealth G(x) for his investment opportunity. Moreover, investing in the
risky asset makes him better oﬀ and yields a higher current consumption, ceteris paribus.T h i s
is reﬂected by the third component in the consumption rule (23), same as the argument for the
after-investment consumption rule (21).
We now turn to the agent’s portfolio rule (24) before investment. In addition to the standard
Merton’s mean-variance term, the agent also has a hedging demand, because his investment
project payoﬀ is correlated with the market portfolio. First, hedging demand is greater when
t h ed e g r e eo fc o r r e l a t i o n|ρ| is higher, the standard and well known result. Second, the portfolio
rule (24) also suggests that hedging demand is greater when G0(x), the option ∆,i sh i g h e r .
This result is less known, but is intuitive. Before the investment decision is made, the agent
holds a valuable option on a non-tradable underlying asset. Hence, the agent naturally hedges
more against the ﬂuctuations of the option value of his investment, if this option value is more
sensitive to the change of the underlying asset (a higher option delta), ceteris paribus.
4M o d e l s w i t h F l o w P a y o ﬀs
While some real world examples may ﬁt in the lump-sum payoﬀ s e t t i n gt h a tw eh a v ej u s t
analyzed, there are many situations under which the investment payoﬀs are given as cash ﬂows
over time, rather than as a lump-sum payment. We emphasize that unlike the lump-sum payoﬀ
case where the project payoﬀ is exogenously given, one has to derive the implied value or the
certainty equivalent value of the cash ﬂows by solving the agent’s consumption decision after
the option exercise. Intuitively, idiosyncratic volatility also lowers the implied project value or
the certainty equivalent wealth after option exercise. Hence, the overall impact of idiosyncratic
volatility on investment decision and implied option value is less obvious. Indeed, we show that
the predictions for the ﬂow payoﬀ case may be reversed compared to those for the lump-sum
payoﬀ case.
In the ﬂow payoﬀ case, after the agent irreversibly exercises his investment option at some
time τ, he obtains a perpetual stream of payoﬀs {Yt : t ≥ τ}. Assume that the ﬂow payoﬀ
process Y is governed by an arithmetic Brownian motion process:
dYt = αy dt + σy dZt,Y 0 given, (30)
where αy and σy are positive constants and Z is a standard Brownian motion. As will be
clear below, the arithmetic Brownian motion process allows us to obtain explicit solutions
after investment so that the problem before investment is easier to analyze. Using a geometric
17Brownian motion process to model the cash ﬂow process will complicate the analysis without
adding many new insights.
We present our analysis in three subsections. First, we analyze the self-insurance case in
which the agent can trade only a risk-free asset and hence all risk is idiosyncratic, similar to
Section 2. Then, we allow the agent to trade a market portfolio to partially hedge against the
ﬂow payoﬀ risk and hence to separate idiosyncratic volatility away from systematic volatility,
similar to Section 3. Finally, we discuss empirical implications of the models in both the lump-
sum and ﬂow payoﬀ cases.
4.1 Self-Insurance
When the agent can trade only a risk-free asset, the agent’s wealth {Wt : t ≥ 0} after the option
exercise (τ ≤ t) evolves according to
dWt =( rWt + Yt − Ct)dt. (31)
This equation resembles that in a standard incomplete markets consumption-savings model
with a stream of labor income {Yt : t ≥ τ}. At the investment time τ, the agent pays the
cost I and hence wealth is lowered from Wτ−, the level just prior to investment, to Wτ,t h e
level immediately after the option exercise, in that Wτ = Wτ−−I. Before exercising the option
(0 ≤ t<τ), the agent does not receive ﬂow payoﬀs and thus his wealth evolves according to (3)
as in the lump-sum case. The agent’s decision problem is to choose both an investment timing
strategy τ and a consumption process C so as to maximize his utility (1) subject to wealth
accumulation equations (31) and (3) and a transversality condition speciﬁed in the appendix.
We solve the agent’s decision problem backward by dynamic programming. Let J (w,y) be
the value function after the option exercise. Unlike the lump-sum payoﬀ case, the payoﬀ value y









Let V (w,y) denote the value function before the option exercise.19 Similar to Section 2, V (w,y)
satisﬁes the following HJB equation:
rV(w,y)=m a x
c∈R





19Note that we use the same notation for the value function before investment as that for the lump-sum payoﬀ
case.
18We now brieﬂy discuss the boundary conditions for the ﬂow payoﬀ case and relate to the
lump-sum payoﬀ case analyzed earlier. Similar to the lump-sum payoﬀ case, the no-bubble
condition limy→−∞ V (w,y)=V 0 (w) must be satisﬁed. Similar to, but diﬀerent from the
lump-sum payoﬀ case, we have the following value matching condition:
V (w,y)=J (w − I,y). (34)
This equation determines an investment boundary y(w). Moreover, the agent’s optimality
further requires the following smooth pasting conditions to hold:
∂V (w,y)
∂y
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
y=y(w)
=
∂J (w − I,y)
∂y





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
y=y(w)
=
∂J (w − I,y)
∂w
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
y=y(w)
. (36)
Both smoothing-pasting conditions are similar to, but diﬀerent from those for the lump-sum
case, because the cash ﬂow payoﬀ y enters as an additional state variable even after the agent
makes the investment.
We use a procedure similar to that in Section 2 to solve the above problem and then show
that the investment threshold ¯ y(w) is independent of wealth w for CARA utility agents.
Proposition 3 The agent exercises the investment option the ﬁrst time the process Y hits the
threshold ¯ y from below. After exercising the option, the optimal consumption rule is given by
c(w,y)=r(w + f (y)), (37)












Before exercising the option, the optimal consumption rule is given by
c(w,y)=r(w + g(y)), (39)










subject to the no-bubble condition limy→−∞ g(y)=0and the boundary conditions





Moreover, g is increasing.
19Comparing Propositions 1 and 3, we see that the valuation equation for the implied option
value is similar. However, the consumption rule after investment and the boundary conditions
are diﬀerent. We next analyze the implications of these diﬀerences.
4.1.1 Implied Project Value and Consumption
When the payoﬀs are given in terms of cash ﬂows over time, the agent continues to face the
undiversiﬁable idiosyncratic cash ﬂow risk after exercising his investment option. Therefore,
the idiosyncratic risk lowers both the implied option value and also the certainty equivalent
project payoﬀ value. After option exercise, the agent’s optimization problem is a standard
incomplete-markets consumption-savings problem with stochastic income {Yt : t ≥ τ}. Because
of the CARA utility and the arithmetic Brownian motion process speciﬁcations, we are able to
derive the explicit expression for the consumption rule given in (37)-(38).20
To understand the consumption rule (37), we deﬁne human wealth h(y) as the present
discounted value of all investment cash ﬂows following Friedman (1957) and Hall (1978). For













Note that this traditional deﬁnition of human wealth does not incorporate the eﬀect of risk.
Using h(y), we may rewrite the consumption rule given in (37) and (38) as follows:
c(w,y)=r
Ã






When γ =0or σy =0 , consumption is the annuity value of the sum of ﬁnancial wealth w
and human wealth h(y),i nt h a tc(w,y)=r(w + h(y)). This is Friedman’s permanent-income
hypothesis. In terms of time series, this implies that consumption is a martingale, in that
Ct = Et (Ct+1), Hall’s random walk consumption model (Hall (1978)).
Importantly, when the agent has precautionary motive (γ>0), a precautionary savings
demand arises in the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks. This demand after the option




in (38). We may interpret f (y) as the certainty
equivalent (risk-adjusted) human wealth or the implied project value, following essentially the




, the certainty equivalent human
20Caballero (1991b) derives this consumption rule in discrete time. Wang (2004) extends Caballero (1991b) to
more general bi-variate income processes with partial observability and hence increases precautionary savings de-
mand due to estimation risk. Wang(2003) shows that general equilibrium restriction eliminates the precautionary
saving demand in Caballero (1991b).
20wealth f (y) d e c r e a s e si nr i s ka v e r s i o nc o e ﬃcient γ and also in income volatility σy.T h i sd i ﬀers
from the lump-sum payoﬀ case where option exercising gives a complete exit from incomplete
markets and hence precautionary motive and volatility do not aﬀect the value of payoﬀsf r o m
exercising.
Now consider consumption before investment. Equation (39) implies that the rational for-
ward looking agent ﬁnances his consumption partially out of his future payoﬀs from his real
investment opportunities. More formally, consumption is given by the annuity value of the
sum of ﬁnancial wealth w and g(y), before the investment is made. Following our analysis in
the lump-sum payoﬀ case, we may interpret g(y) as the certainty equivalent wealth for the
investment opportunity before investment is made, or equivalently, the implied option value on
the investment opportunity. We next turn to the analysis of g(y).
4.1.2 Implied Option Value and Investment Threshold
The implied option value g(y) and the investment threshold ¯ y are determined jointly by the
the diﬀerential equation (40) and the corresponding boundary conditions (41) and (42). The
diﬀerential equation (40) is similar to its counterpart (12) for the lump-sum payoﬀ case. How-
ever, the boundary conditions for the ﬂow payoﬀ case are diﬀerent from those for the lump-sum
payoﬀ case in Proposition 1 in that the agent values the stream of payoﬀs after option exercise
with the certainty equivalent wealth f (y) given in (38). These boundary conditions jointly
suggest that the investment thres h o l di sd e t e r m i n e db yt r a d i n go ﬀ between the option value of
waiting g(y) and the certainty equivalent wealth f(y) for the stochastic income stream (after
netting out the ﬁxed investment cost I).
Unlike the lump-sum payoﬀ case, the total payoﬀ volatility σy and the precautionary motive
also lower the implied project value f (y), because the agent is exposed to idiosyncratic shocks
after making his investment decision, and hence values the cash ﬂow at a value lower than h(y),
the present discounted value of his future incomes.
It is transparent to analyze the impact of risk aversion coeﬃcient γ and income volatility
σy on the investment threshold ¯ y via the approximation method. We approximate g(y) and ¯ y
simultaneously to the ﬁrst order of σ2
y. We then obtain the approximate investment threshold:





where ¯ y0 = rI is the exactly solved investment threshold in the deterministic case (σy =0 ) .
Therefore, to the ﬁrst-order approximation, the investment threshold ¯ y1 increases in volatility
σy, and moreover, the agent’s risk attitude does not aﬀect investment timing. This prediction
21is thus qualitatively the same as in the standard real option models to the ﬁrst order.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In the ﬂow payoﬀ case, the agent receives a stream
of uninsurable incomes after the option exercise. Therefore, the agent’s precautionary motive
lowers both the implied project value f (y) and the implied option value g(y). It turns out
that the precautionary eﬀect on g(y) and f (y) oﬀsets each other to the ﬁrst-order approxima-
tion. Thus, it has little impact on the investment timing since the investment threshold ¯ y is
determined by the relative magnitudes of the implied option value g(y) and the project payoﬀ
f(y). This result diﬀers from the lump-sum payoﬀ case where precautionary motive only aﬀects
the implied option value, not the project payoﬀ value. As a result, the investment threshold is
lowered by the agent’s precautionary motive to the ﬁrst-order approximation in the lump-sum
payoﬀ case. Unlike the lump-sum payoﬀ case, exercising the option does not eliminate the eﬀect
of uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks, when payoﬀsa r eg i v e ni nﬂow terms over time.
To further understand the impact of the agent’s precautionary motive γ on the investment
decision, we use the second-order approximation with respect to σ2
y and obtain the following
approximate investment threshold:











where ¯ y1 is given in (45). Equation (46) indicates that, to the second-order approximation,
the investment threshold increases in γ, opposite to the prediction for the lump-sum payoﬀ
case. While the precautionary saving eﬀect is present both before and after the option exercise
as argued earlier, the precautionary saving eﬀect, to the second-order approximation, has a
larger impact on f (y) than on g (y). The intuition is as follows. Before exercising the option,
the agent may time when to invest in the risky investment. While the volatility eﬀect on the
implied option value g(y) and the implied project value f(y) to the ﬁrst order washes out,
this additional ﬂexibility of timing the investment decision on the margin implies that the
precautionary saving eﬀect is stronger after exercising the option than before. This suggests
that an increase in the precautionary motive γ lowers f (y) more than g (y), thereby delaying
the exercise of the option. We emphasize that the eﬀect of γ on the investment decision is of
the second order.
Finally, we use numerical solutions to conduct further analysis. Figure 3 plots the investment
threshold as a function of volatility σy and the parameter γ. This ﬁgure conﬁrms our preceding
approximation results. Moreover, it illustrates that the eﬀects of volatility σy on the investment
threshold are stronger when the agent is more precautionary, i.e., when γ is higher.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
22Figure 4 illustrates the eﬀect of changes in γ.A ni n c r e a s ei nγ raises precautionary savings
both after and before the option exercise, thereby lowering both the implied project value f (y)
and the implied option value g (y).T h i sﬁgure conﬁrms our earlier analysis that f (y) is lowered
more than g (y), so that the agent delays exercising the investment option.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
4.2 Hedging
We now turn to the ﬂow payoﬀ case with hedging opportunity. Based on our previous analysis,
we anticipate that the model contains the following two features: (i) the hedging opportunity al-
lows the separation of idiosyncratic volatility from the systematic volatility, and hence captures
the diﬀerent eﬀects of these two forms of volatility on investment and consumption decisions;
(ii) the ﬂow payoﬀ implies that idiosyncratic volatility continues to matter after option exercise
and hence lowers the certainty equivalent payoﬀ value, similar to the self-insurance model for
the ﬂow payoﬀ case.
Let πt denote the amount allocated in the risky asset with returns given in (17) at time t.
As in Section 3, we may denote  y as the idiosyncratic volatility, in that
 y =
p
1 − ρ2 σy. (47)
We may rewrite the observed ﬂow payoﬀ process {Yt : t ≥ 0} given in (30) as follows:
dYt = αydt + ρσydBt +  y d e Bt, (48)
where B describes the systematic (market) risk and e B describes the idiosyncratic project risk.
Before the agent exercises the investment option at time τ, his wealth accumulation is the
same as (20). After time τ, his wealth evolves as follows:
dWt =[ rWt + πt (μe − r)+Yt − Ct]dt + πtσedBt. (49)
Note that the ﬂow payoﬀ Y appears in (49), not in (20). As before, the agent’s wealth imme-
diately after his investment Wτ is given by Wτ = Wτ− −I,w h e r eWτ− denotes his wealth level
just prior to his investment at time τ. The following proposition characterizes the solution.
Proposition 4 The agent exercises the investment option the ﬁrst time the process Y hits the































Before exercising the option, the optimal consumption and portfolio rules are given by
¯ c(w,y)=r
µ














where (g, ¯ y) is the solution to the following free boundary problem:









subject to the no-bubble condition limy→−∞ g(y)=0 , and the boundary conditions





Moreover, g is increasing.
As in the previous subsection, we interpret f (y) as the implied project value and g(y) as
the implied option value. Unlike the lump-sum payoﬀ model with hedging opportunities in
Section 3, hedging aﬀects not only the implied option value g (y), but also the implied project
value f (y). In particular, hedging reduces the agent’s exposure to idiosyncratic volatility from
σy to  y =
p









. In addition, the portfolio rule (51) after the option
exercise consists of the standard mean-variance term and the hedging demand term.21
To compare with the complete markets solution, we assume that the agent can trade an
additional risky asset to diversify the idiosyn c r a t i cr i s ka si nS e c t i o n3 . 2 . A p p e n d i xBs h o w s
that the market value of the investment option satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation





21See Svensson and Werner (1993) and Davis and Willen (2002) for the consumption and portfolio choice
problem under incomplete markets in a continuous-time setting and a discrete-time setting, respectively.







is the market value of the cash ﬂow process Y . The above two equations reveal that both the
option value and the project value under complete markets are independent of preferences and
eﬀectively are the solutions in (52) and (55) for γ =0 . In addition, both values are higher than
under incomplete markets. Similar to our analysis in Section 4.1.2, the net eﬀect of incomplete
hedging on the investment timing depends on the relative magnitudes of changes in the implied
option value and the project value. Similar to the insights from the self-insurance model with
ﬂow payoﬀs, the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on the project value is greater than on the
option value to the second order. Thus, unlike in the lump-sum payoﬀ case analyzed in Section
3.2, incomplete hedging raises the investment threshold and delays investment, compared to
the complete markets benchmark. This result demonstrates that the timing of payoﬀsm a t t e r s
for investment decision under incomplete markets, which is diﬀerent from a complete markets
setting where the timing of payoﬀsd o e sn o tm a t t e ra ss h o w ni nA p p e n d i xB .
4.3 Empirical Implications
Our analysis has empirical implications. For example, the model in Section 2 suggests that
unlike a standard real options analysis, a positive investment-uncertainty relationship may po-
tentially arise for entrepreneurial activities, when the idiosyncratic risk is suﬃciently large.
Thus, one may be cautious in interpreting some conﬂicting results found in empirical studies.22
Our analysis also suggests that the investment behavior of undiversiﬁed individuals is diﬀerent
from that of well-diversiﬁed individuals or institutions. In particular, risk attitude plays an
important role under incomplete markets. Consider again the real estate development exam-
ple. Suppose that we have a sample containing both undiversiﬁed individual developers and
publicly traded REITs. Suppose that both individual entrepreneurs and REITs specialize in
development of and not management of the properties. That is, we may take the sales value of
the property upon completion of constructions as given. Then our model in Section 3 predicts
that the individual entrepreneurs are more likely to develop earlier than the publicly traded
REITs, because the idiosyncratic risk lowers the implied option value of waiting for individ-
ual developers. However, if they also manage the properties after completion of development,
then our models in the previous two subsections suggest that the preceding prediction may be
reversed because the properties are also less valuable to the undiversiﬁed individual developers.
22See Quigg (1993), Berger et al. (1996), Leahy and White (1996), and Moel and Tufano (1998) for empirical
works. See Caballero (1991a) for a theoretical analysis.
255C o n c l u s i o n s
Entrepreneurs’ business investment opportunities are often nontradable and their payoﬀsc a n -
not be spanned by existing traded assets due to reasons such as incentives and informational
asymmetries. These features invalidate the standard real options approach to investment. Ex-
tending this approach, we develop a utility-based real options model to analyze an agent’s
interdependent real investment, consumption, and portfolio choice decisions.
We show that project volatility has not only a positive option eﬀect, but also a negative
eﬀect on the implied option value. The latter eﬀect is induced by the precautionary saving
motive. For the lump-sum payoﬀ case, risk aversion accelerates investment. Unlike the standard
real options analysis, an increase in project volatility may accelerate investment if the agent
has a suﬃciently strong precautionary motive. We further extend our model to allow for the
opportunity to hedge. We show that hedging reduces the agent’s exposure to idiosyncratic
risk, and hence raises the option value. In addition, hedging allows the decomposition of total
project volatility into systematic volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. The latter volatility
generates an idiosyncratic risk premium. We ﬁnally analyze settings where investment payoﬀs
are given in ﬂow terms over time. Unlike the standard real options analysis, the lump-sum and
ﬂow payoﬀ cases have diﬀerent implications. Because the precautionary saving eﬀect matters
both before and after investment in the ﬂow payoﬀ case, many predictions in this case diﬀer
from and may even be opposite to those in the lump-sum payoﬀ case.
In order to analyze the eﬀect of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk on investment in the simplest
possible setting, we have intentionally ignored the wealth eﬀect by adopting the CARA utility.
However, the wealth eﬀect may potentially play an important role in settings such as entrepre-
neurship. We extend our analysis to incorporate the wealth eﬀect on entrepreneurial investment
in Miao and Wang (2005a). Finally, when entrepreneurs invest in nontradable projects, they
often need to make ﬁnancing decisions jointly. For the real estate example, often the majority
part of the construction and operating expenses is ﬁnanced by mortgages. We analyze the
interaction between investment and ﬁnancing decisions in Miao and Wang (2005b).
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AP r o o f s
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : >From the ﬁrst-order condition U0(c)=Vw (w,x), we can derive
the consumption policy before the option exercise given in (11). Substituting it into the HJB
equation (5), we can show that G(x) satisﬁes the ODE (12). Given the functional forms of the
value functions, we can also show that the no-bubble condition, the value-matching and the
smooth-pasting conditions become the boundary conditions in Proposition 1. By a standard
dynamic programming argument, one can show that V satisﬁes





e−rtU (Ct)dt + e−rτV 0 (Wτ + Xτ − I)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯(W0,X 0)=( w,x)
¸
. (A.1)
Consider x<x 0. For X0 = x0, let τ0 be the optimal investment time and {C
0
t :0≤ t ≤ τ0} be
the optimal consumption process before investment. Since V 0 is an increasing function and,
given any sample path,
Xτ0 ≡ x + αxτ0 + σxWτ0 <X 0


































V 0 (Wτ0 + Xτ0 − I)
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Given the wealth dynamics described in Section 2.1, {C0
t :0≤ t ≤ τ0} and τ0 are also feasible
for X0 = x. Thus, the left side of the above equation is less or equal to V (w,x) by (A.1). So,
V (w,x) <V(w,x0) and V is increasing in x. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : Without risk of confusion, we still use V 0 (w) and V (w,x) to
denote the value function after and before the option exercise, respectively, when the agent can
trade a risky asset. By a standard argument, V 0 satisﬁes the following HJB equation:
rV 0 (w)= m a x











=0must also be satisﬁed. Given CARA














Before the option exercise, the value function V (w,x) satisﬁes the following HJB equation:
rV (w,x)= m a x




































one can derive the optimal consumption and portfolio policies before exercising the option
given in (23)-(24). Plugging these expressions back into the HJB equation gives (25). As in
Section 2, the boundary conditions are given by the no-bubble, value-matching, and smooth-
pasting conditions similar to (6)-(8). Using these boundary conditions, one can derive the
boundary conditions in Proposition 2. The rest of the proof follows a similar argument to that
in Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : We conjecture that the value function after the option exercise J




exp[−γr(w + f(y))], (A.7)
where f(y) is a function to be determined. To solve for this function, we use the ﬁrst-order
condition U0 (c)=Jw (w,y) to derive the optimal consumption rule given in (37). Substitute it
back into the HJB equation (32) to derive the following ODE:







It can be veriﬁed that its solution is given by (38). Moreover, it is such that the value function









exp[−γr(w + g(y))], (A.9)
where g(y) is a function to be determined. From the ﬁrst-order condition U0(c)=Vw (w,y),
we can derive the consumption policy before investment given in (39). Substituting it into the
HJB equation (33), we can show that g(y) satisﬁes the ODE (40). By a standard dynamic
programming argument, one can show that V satisﬁes





e−rtU (Ct)dt + e−rτJ (Wτ − I,Yτ)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯(W0,Y 0)=( w,y)
¸
. (A.10)
Since it follows from (A.7) that J is increasing and concave in y, one can show that V is also
increasing and concave in y. The rest of the proof follows from a similar argument to that in
Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Without risk of confusion, we still use J (w,y) and V (w,y) to
denote the value function after and before the option exercise, respectively, when the agent can
also trade a risky asset. By a standard argument, J (w,y) satisﬁes the HJB equation
rJ (w,y)= m a x














=0must also be satisﬁed. We con-


























one can derive the optimal consumption and portfolio policies after investment given in (53)-
(54). Substituting them back into the HJB equation (A.11), one can derive the solution for
f (y) given in (52). It can be veriﬁed that this solution satisﬁes the transversality condition.
The value function before the option exercise, V ,s a t i s ﬁes the following HJB equation:
rV (w,y)= m a x




































one can derive the optimal consumption and portfolio policies before investment given in (50)-
(51). Plugging these expressions into the HJB equation gives a diﬀerential equation for g(·).
The rest of the proof follows from a similar argument to that in Propositions 1 and 3. Q.E.D.
B Complete Markets Solution
To derive the market markets solution, we the agent can trade an additional risky asset which
spans the idiosyncratic risk generated by the Brownian motion e B. Speciﬁcally, let the return of
the second risky asset be given by dSt/St = rdt+σSd e Bt, where σS is a positive constant. Since
the idiosyncratic risk is by deﬁnition independent of the market risk, this risky asset yields an
expected rate of return r and does not demand a risk premium by the CAPM. Therefore, the
implied unique stochastic discount factor ξ is given by −dξt/ξt = rdt+ηdBt with ξ0 =1 ,w h e r e
η is the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio.
The agent’s joint consumption, investment and asset allocation decision problem can then
be formulated as a two-stage problem with the agent (i) choosing an investment policy to
maximize the option value so that the agent’s total wealth is maximized; and (ii)c h o o s i n g
optimal consumption given this total wealth.
We ﬁrst derive the solution for the lump-sum payoﬀ case. Using the unique stochastic




ξτ (Xτ − I)
¯ ¯
¯ ¯X0 = x
¸
. (B.1)










where λx = −σ−2
x (αx − ρησx)+
q
σ−4
x (αx − ρησx)
2 +2 rσ−2
x > 0.





ξtYt dt − ξτI
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯Y0 = y
¸
. (B.4)













where λy = −σ−2
y (αy − ρησy)+
q
σ−4
y (αy − ρησy)
2 +2 rσ−2
y > 0.
We observe that, under complete markets, the lump-sum and ﬂow payoﬀ formulations are
mathematically equivalent, since we may discount cash ﬂows using the unique stochastic dis-





= F (Yt), we can show that the
problems (B.1) and (B.4) are equivalent. Thus, they deliver the same option value Φ(x)=Ψ(y)
and investment timing strategy. However, this equivalence fails when the investment opportu-
nity is not tradable and not spanned by the existing traded assets.
CA p p r o x i m a t i o n M e t h o d
In this appendix, we provide our approximation solution methodology. We sketch out the
procedure for the self insurance model with a lump-sum payoﬀ. Essentially identical procedures
may be applied to models in Section 3 and 4. We may divide the procedure into four steps.





.W i t hσx =0 , risk attitude (γ)
does not aﬀect the investment threshold. The implied option value G0(x) and the investment








(x − ¯ x0)
¸
,x ≤ ¯ x0, (C.1)
¯ x0 = I +
αx
r
.( C . 2 )
Step 2. Consider small σ2
x. Conjecture that the approximate option value and the investment
threshold are
G(x) ≈ G0 (x)+G1 (x)σ2
x , (C.3)
¯ x1 =¯ x0 + δ1σ2 , (C.4)
31where G0 (x) and ¯ x0 are solved in Step 1, and G1 (x) and δ1 are the coeﬃcient function and
the coeﬃcient to be determined.
Step 3. Plugging the approximate solution (C.3) into the ODE (12) and boundary conditions
(13)-(14) and keeping the terms up to σ2











2 = rG1 (x) , (C.5)
subject to G1(¯ x1)=0and G0
1(¯ x1)=−rδ1/αx. Note that unlike the original nonlinear ODE
(12) for G(x), we now have a free boundary problem deﬁned by a ﬁrst-order ODE (C.5) for
G1(x) with certain boundary conditions.
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− r












We describe the solution method to the free boundary problem described in Proposition 3. The
problems described in other propositions can be solved similarly. We use the projection method
implemented with collocation (Judd (1998)). We do not use the traditional shooting method
or ﬁnite diﬀerence method because these methods are ineﬃcient for our nonlinear problem and
extensive simulations.
We ﬁrst rewrite the second order ODE (40) as a system of ﬁrst-order ODEs. Let ∆(y)=





(rg(y) − αy∆(y)) + γr∆(y)2. (D.1)




g(y)=f (y) − I, (D.3)
∆(y)=1 /r. (D.4)
Note that condition (D.2) states that when y goes to minus inﬁnity, the agent never exercises
the investment option, and hence the implied option value is equal to zero.
The idea of the algorithm is to ﬁrst ignore the smooth-pasting condition (D.4) and then to
solve a two point boundary value problem with a guessed threshold value y0. Since the boundary





32true value of the threshold is found by adjusting y0 so that the smooth-pasting condition (D.4)
is satisﬁed. We then adjust y so that the solution is not sensitive to this value. The algorithm
is outlined as follows.
Step 1. Start with a guess y0 and a preset order n.








where Ti (y) is the Chebyshev polynomial of order i,a n da =( a0,a 1,...,a n) and b =( b0,b 1,...,b n)
are 2n+2constants to be determined. Substitute the above expressions into the preceding sys-
tem of ODEs and evaluate it at n roots of Tn (y). Together with the two boundary conditions,
we then have 2n +2equations for 2n +2unknowns a =( a0,a 1,...,a n) and b =( b0,b 1,...,b n).
Let the solution be b a and b b.




=1 /r, is approxi-
mately satisﬁed.
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Figure 1: Implied option value G(x). This ﬁgure plots the functions x−I and G(x) for the
model in Section 2. The parameter values are set as follows: r =2 % ,α x =0 .1,σ x =2 0 % , and











































Figure 2: Investment threshold, risk aversion, and project volatility. This ﬁgure plots
the investment threshold at varying levels of γ and σx for the lump sum payoﬀ case. Other








































Figure 3: Investment threshold, risk aversion, and project volatility. This ﬁgure plots
the investment threshold at varying levels of γ and σy for the ﬂow payoﬀ case. Other parameter
values are set as β = r =2 % ,α y =0 .1, and I =1 0

























Figure 4: Impact of changes in γ in the ﬂow payoﬀ case. This ﬁgure plots the impact
on g(y) and f (y) when the value of γ is increased from 1 to 2. Other parameter values are set
as β = r =2 % , αy =0 .1,σ y = 30%, and I =1 0 .
41